Administrative Law by Fitzgerald, John L.
SMU Law Review
Volume 23




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation






Adequacy of Notice and Hearing. Due process of law requires that a
student be given notice and an opportunity for a hearing before he may
be suspended from a state university on grounds of misconduct.' In a
recent case, seven former students at Texas Southern University, a state
institution, alleged that they had been suspended from the university in
violation of their fourteenth amendment rights to notice and a hearing.
A federal district court dismissed the suit as to all of the plaintiffs.
The court refused to rule on the constitutional arguments of four of
the students, applying the familiar rule that the federal courts will not
pass on a constitutional issue when alternative grounds exist for deciding
the case. The four students in question had failed their courses and thus
were scholastically ineligible to return to the university. Since these stu-
dents could not return to school even if they proved their allegations, the
court found that their claims presented "no substantial federal question
which is presently justiciable."'
Two other students claimed that the notice given them was inadequate
to satisfy due process of law. One was observed by the Dean of Students
violating university rules and was at that time told to come to the Dean's
office for a conference, but refused. The other had previously conferred
with the Dean regarding his purported violation of university rules and
had been told that he would be under observation for the rest of the
semester; subsequently, the Dean saw him again breaking school rules
but did not orally request a conference. The Dean attempted to com-
municate with both students by mail to request conferences, but since
both had moved and had failed to notify the university, as required by
the University regulations, neither received his letter. The court held that
the requirements of due process were satisfied, concluding that notice in
accordance with valid regulations had been given. The court stressed that
the Dean had used his best efforts to inform the two students of the na-
ture of the complaints against them and that more was not required.
The seventh student, after being given notice, appeared at conferences
with the Dean and the President of the University, following which he
was dismissed. The court concluded that since this student had offered no
evidence indicating that his hearing was constitutionally inadequate the
* B.A., LL.B., University of Washington; LL.M., Harvard University; S.J.D., Georgetown Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
930 (1961). Dixon is reviewed in Note, Degree of Discretionary Authority Possessed by University
Officials in Student Disciplinary Matters-The Availability of Mandamus, 21 Sw. L.J. 664, 667
(1967).
'Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
8id. at 112.
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court should not substitute its judgment for that of university officials.
The court did not state that an opportunity for a conference would be
an adequate hearing in all circumstances; rather, it placed the burden on
the complaining student to allege in what manner the hearing given was
inadequate. This burden was not carried by the student.
The decision seems entirely correct. It exemplifies a case by case carving-
out of fair rules of procedure adjustable to the seriousness of the discip-
linary penalty, the presence of controversial facts, and the maintenance
of a university community dedicated to high standards of education.
Right To Consolidated Hearing. Several motor carriers applied to the
Texas Railroad Commission for authority to transport essentially the
same commodities in the same areas. The Commission heard appellees' ap-
plications in August 1965; appellants' applications were heard in Septem-
ber and October 1965. The applications of appellees and of one of the ap-
pellants were granted. The application of the other appellant was denied
because of the grants to its competitors. Appellants brought suit to en-
join appellees from operating under their newly certificated authority.
The district court dismissed the suit, holding that since the appellants
had no justiciable interest entitling them to participate in appellees' hear-
ing, from which they had been excluded under rule 30 of the Commis-
sion's motor transportation division's procedures," they had no standing
to petition for judicial review of the administrative order.' The court of
civil appeals affirmed! The court said that "[ilt would be indeed strange
to hold that one could appeal from the result of a proceeding in which
he had no right to appear. '
4 Rule 30 of the Commission provides in part that "Any party at interest . . . is any motor
carrier . .. transporting any of the same class or classes of commodities proposed to be transported
by applicant." The trial examiner of the Commission construed this rule to require that a protesting
carrier must show that it is presently authorized to transport the commodities named in the appli-
cation it is protesting. The protesting carriers, excluded under rule 30 from the hearing on the
Groendyke application, were separately applying for a certificate to transport the same commodities.
The speculative character of their present competitive interest was considered too speculative to
qualify them as parties to the hearing on the Groendyke application, or to confer standing to ob-
tain judicial review of the grant of the application, since the protestants' applications might be
denied by the Commission. Justice Rutledge similarly pointed out, in FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill
Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 272 (1949), that "suppositious eventualities" are insufficient to confer
a right of protest.
Under the present rules of procedure of the Transportation Division, the result might well be
different. Rule 26, Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Transportation Division of the Rail-
road Commission of Texas, permits consolidation of hearings upon applications if the Commission
finds "that the two or more applications . . . or other proceedings involve common questions of
law and fact," and further finds "that separate hearings would result in unwarranted expense or
delay or substantial injustice."
' Although there is a similarity between requirements for standing to intervene in administrative
proceedings and standing to secure judicial review of administrative action, the tests applied are
not identical, and the statement of the court of civil appeals is too broad. Groendyke Transp., Inc.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 426 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.; 3 K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 22.08 (1958); L. JAF E, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 510-11 (1965). Statutes may provide different criteria for establishing the right to an ad-
ministrative hearing than for establishing the right to judicial review. Further, the terms and con-
ditions of the final order in an administrative proceeding may create a right of judicial review
though no right to an administrative hearing therefore existed.
'Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 426 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error
ref. n.r.e.
7 1d. at 648.
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If a competitor, X, argues that he is entitled to standing to appeal a
grant of a certificate to Y merely because he is a competitor of Y, the
courts generally reject the argument s If X attempts to buttress his argu-
ment by showing that X is applying for the same kind of certificate as Y
and that if X obtains a certificate he may be adversely affected by Y's
operations if Y also obtains a certificate, the courts consider X's party-
in-interest claim too speculative to recognize.
The appellants, however, presented a much more direct claim of legal
injury entitling them to be parties in interest, the so-called Ashbacker
doctrine.' Appellants argued that they were applying for similar certifi-
cates as appellees, that for economic or physical reasons all applications
could not be granted by the Commission, and that they were entitled,
therefore, to a joint comparative hearing with the opposing applicants as
a matter of due process of law." Finally, if so entitled, appellants con-
tended that they qualified as dissatisfied persons entitled to petition for
judicial review of the grants to the opposing parties under the Motor
Transportation Act.'
The court of civil appeals rejected this claim, noting that the grant of
authority to the appellees did not preclude "physically or economically"12
the possibility of grants to appellants, and that one of the appellants in
fact had received a grant. The court gave weight to the administrative
burden that would be cast upon the Commission if all competing appli-
a "Decisions go both ways on the right of a competitor to intervene, the result usually being
to uphold the administrative decision." 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 327 (1965).
See also Oberst, Parties to Administrative Proceedings, 40 MICH. L. REV. 378, 404 (1942).
'This rule had its origin in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
The Communications Act permits the FCC to grant but not to deny a broadcasting
application without hearing. Ashbacker concerned competing applications to operate
on the same frequency. The Commission granted one without hearing and set the
other for hearing. A majority held that as 'a practical matter' this 'substantially
nullified' the statutory right of hearing. The FCC now consolidates into a single
proceeding mutually exclusive applications. Though the Government argued that
Ashbacker could not appeal until and unless its own application was dismissed after
hearing, neither majority nor minority chose to deal with this contention. And it
seems never to have been made a requirement of review of the refusal of comparative
treatment that appellant have exhausted his administrative remedy ....
L. JAFFE, suftra note 5, at 444.
As Jaffe further points out, this rule has been extended to competing applications for air routes;
and it is the air route cases that the opinion of the court of civil appeals cites. Northwest Airlines
v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952), and Delta Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955), are among the earlier Civil Aeronautics Board cases holding
that the Ashbacker rule is applicable to contesting applicants for an airline route license which
are "as a matter of economic fact mutually exclusive," and therefore each applicant is entitled to
a comparative hearing and consideration with his adversary. Delta Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., supra, at 22 (emphasis added).
" The theory presented to the court was that the administrative tribunal is not likely to over-
turn the first grant it makes, notwithstanding it later hears evidence on the second application;
therefore the second hearing (that involving their application) is rendered defective from the
standpoint of fullness and fairness.
" TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 911b, § 20 (1964).
12 Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 426 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error ref. n.r.e. The court made reference to the rule of the Asbbacker case, supra note 9, in this
connection. It also referred to language in Alamo Express, Inc. v. Union City Transfer, 158 Tex.
234, 242, 309 S.W.2d 815, 821 (1958), stating that the administrative tribunal possesses complete
discretion with respect to when it will consolidate applications into one hearing. (That case, how-
ever, upheld the Railroad Commission's exercise of discretion in consolidating the applications of
as many as 128 specialized motor carriers for modification of 150 certificates, each application in-
volving transportation of the same commodities.)
1969] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
cants must be considered parties in interest for the purposes of each appli-
cation proceeding.
On motion for rehearing, appellants argued that the Ashbacker rule
should control because economic or physical reasons dictated that only
some (as opposed to all) of the applications in this proceeding could be
granted. The opinion on rehearing announced the court's agreement with
the Ashbacker doctrine, a but pointed out that since this issue was never
presented to the Commission before or after denial of a joint comparative
hearing by the examiner, its consideration by the court was foreclosed. "
Hence, the court did not determine whether Ashbacker would be ap-
plicable under the circumstances urged by the appellants' motion for
rehearing.
The Ashbacker rule is entirely defensible on grounds of fairness, and its
apparent adoption in Texas provides a welcome addition to our law."
Nevertheless the decision can be questioned. Questions of law generally
are the province of the courts, and whether due process requires that
mutually exclusive applications be heard in a consolidated proceeding ap-
pears to be a legal question. It seems inconsistent with Texas precedent,
upholding review of administrative decisions by de novo trial, with re-
trial of the facts freely permitted, to apply a different rule to questions
of law. However, granted the question whether due process requires the
" The court stated, "when a nonfrivolous allegation of mutual exclusivity of applications is
before the [Railroad] Commission, . . . the Commission should decide this issue and, if sustained,
grant a full joint and comparative hearing as . . . defined [in Delta Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955)]." Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 426
S.W.2d 645, 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
" The court's decision on the appeal, id. at 647, states: "This record shows that appellants
requested the Commission to consolidate, for hearing, all applications, theirs, appellees and other
carriers, for similar authority, which request is denied." In Northwest Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952), the court considered the question whether the petitioning
carrier forfeited its right to a simultaneous hearing by not making the request before the exam-
iner's hearing began. The carrier had waited until the hearing ended and it filed its exceptions to
the examiner's report. The court said, id. at 345: "When that information is given to the Board
in less formal fashion, as it was in this case, it would be harsh indeed to deny the applicant a
fundamental right simply because of the informality of his approach."
Groendyke Transport, Inc., after losing its appeal due to lack of standing, Groendyke Transp.,
Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 426 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e., subsequently
was enjoined from further operation under its newly amended motor carrier's certificate and the
court set aside the Railroad Commission's orders granting the new certification to Groendyke. The
court held that the carriers, whose newly amended certificates Groendyke was precluded from con-
testing in the earlier decision, had shown there was no need for additional carrier certifications for
the routes and commodities involved, e.g., Groendyke's administratively approved proposal. Railroad
Comm'n v. Robertson Transp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
"5 In a later case, a court of civil appeals, citing the Groendyke decision, adopted the view that
when two applications are mutually exclusive, comparative hearings are proper, in view of the
possibility that the Savings and Loan Commissioner after hearing the evidence may grant one appli-
cation to the exclusion of the other. Peoples Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Community Say. & Loan Ass'n,
430 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
However, it should be noticed that in the Peoples case separate (though comparative) hearings
were held on the application by one party for a new savings and loan charter in Llano, and on the
application by a savings and loan association for a branch office in Llano. Thereafter, separate
decisions were handed down by the Commissioner, but only after consulting the records made in
both cases. He denied both applications. Delta Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 228 F.2d 17
(D.C. Cir. 1955), condemned a proposed procedure for "simultaneous decision" of separate hearings
as not satisfying the comparative hearing requirement of the Asbbacker rule. The Court said:
"The Court was concerned with the right to hearing, not merely the rendition of decision. The
requirement for a comparative proceeding means all the give-and-take of contesting parties, in-
cluding cross-examination, rebuttal, participation in preheating proceedings, objection, briefs and
arguments as contesting parties." 228 F.2d at 22.
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agency to hold a consolidated hearing is a legal one, a factual issue is in-
dispensable to its solution, namely whether the applications involved are
mutually exclusive. The latter requires an administrative policy con-
clusion, and this may be a pragmatic reason to support the court's ultimate
disposition of the proceeding. Moreover, were it not for the Texas de
novo trial tradition-a compromise in statutory construction due to sepa-
ration of powers impediments to complete de novo review-it would be
clearly preferable, under the analogy of requiring that administrative
remedies be exhausted before judicial relief is sought, that the administra-
tive tribunal be given the opportunity to consider in its proceeding any
issue that will be raised on review.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
Res Judicata.
While in theory the principles of res judicata are not strictly applicable to
administrative adjudication, there appears to be an increasing trend, on the
part of state courts particularly, to deny state administrative agencies the
power to revoke their prior decisions with retroactive effect where to do so
would cause injury to a party. Sometimes, indeed, the courts press this doc-
trine to its logical conclusion by asserting that, in proper cases at least, the
doctrine of res judicata should apply in administrative proceedings. 6
It was contended in a federal district court case, 7 somewhat unusual on
its facts, that the negative finding of a jury in a previous civil action
barred, under the rules of collateral estoppel and res judicata, a subsequent
award of compensation benefits by the Deputy Commissioner under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act."
The plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries allegedly received
while working on board a vessel. Judgment was entered that the plaintiff
take nothing, based upon a jury finding that the plaintiff did not sustain
the injury while working aboard the vessel. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed
a claim for compensation for the same injury under the Longshoremen's
Act, and after a full hearing the Deputy Commissioner found that the
claimant did receive the injury while working on the vessel. The Deputy
Commissioner entered an award, and rejected the asserted defenses of col-
lateral estoppel and res judicata.
The federal district court refused to set the award aside, holding that
the standard of proof required to establish a fact before the Deputy Com-
missioner is less stringent than that needed to establish a fact before a
jury. Before a jury facts must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence. But, under the applicable provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act," an order of the Deputy Commissioner need only be sup-
ported by "substantial" evidence, a lesser standard which has been likened
to the "substantial" evidence required by a reviewing court in affirming
"6Cooper, Administrative Law, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 8 (1963).
'
7 Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 276 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
1833 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1965).
'85 U.S.C. S 556(d) (1965).
[Vol. 23
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the findings of an agency hearing examiner." Since the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel are confined to instances in which "the
fact issue raised in the second proceeding is identical in all respects and
the applicable legal rules remain unchanged,"'" the court concluded that
they were not applicable. As further support for its decision, the court
stated that under the policy of the Longshoremen's Act doubtful ques-
tions of fact should be resolved in favor of the claimant, a presumption
not available to a jury operating under a preponderance of the evidence
standard.
Administrative Finality. Recently, a court of civil appeals held that if the
record of proceedings taken before the state Savings and Loan Commis-
sioner shows that a city can sustain a new branch office of a savings and
loan association, or a newly chartered association, but not both, then
once the Commissioner grants one application he no longer has the free-
dom to grant the other."
In this case the Commissioner concluded that there was insufficient
business in the city of Llano to support either a branch office of Com-
munity Savings and Loan or a new facility, the proposed Peoples Savings
and Loan, and denied both applications. Both applicants appealed, their
appeals were consolidated for trial purposes only, and the district court
reversed the Commissioner as to each appeal. Judgment became final in
Peoples' application for a new charter since the Commissioner did not
make a timely motion for a new trial." Pursuant to the district court's
reversal the Commissioner granted a charter to Peoples.
The Commissioner timely filed a motion for new trial in Community's
application for a branch office and a retrial was held. The district court
again reversed the Commissioner's denial of the application, holding that
it was not supported by substantial evidence. The court of civil appeals,
however, reversed the district court on the ground that the district court
had ignored the fact that the Commissioner had, prior to the retrial,
granted Peoples' application for a new charter. This supervening fact was
not part of the administrative record before the court of civil appeals."
However, since the record did show that Llano could not support both
facilities, the court concluded that it should take judicial notice of the
fact that Peoples' application for a new charter already had been granted.'
Had the court not taken such notice, it may be inferred that the court
would have held that there was no substantial evidence supporting the
2 John W. McGrath Corp. v. Hughes, 264 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931
(1959); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE ACT 76 (1947).
*1Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 276 F. Supp. 610, 614 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
22Peoples Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Community Say. & Loan Ass'n, 430 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
28Buttery v. Belts, 422 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1968).
24 On appeal, the court is restricted to a review of the administrative record. See the text ac-
companying note 45 infra.
MThe Supreme Court of Texas denied a writ of error, n.r.e., 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75 (Oct. 30,
1968), holding that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner's denial of application, and
withholding opinion on the correctness, under the revised Savings and Loan Act, of taking judicial
notice of a supervening event not part of the administrative record under review.
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Commissioner's action. Thus, by taking judicial notice of the extra-record
fact, the court avoided interfering with the Commissioner's discretion.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Method of Review. The Safety Responsibilities Law2" provides that a ve-
hicle operator involved in an accident within the state, in which accident
a person is killed or injured, or the property damage of any one person
is one hundred dollars or more, must file a report of the accident with
the Department of Public Safety. Upon receipt of the report the Depart-
ment may suspend the operator's license and motor vehicle registration
unless the operator has been released of liability, has insurance, or proves
that he is financially responsible and deposits security in an amount the
Department finds sufficient to satisfy any judgments for damages resulting
from the accident. 7 The Department must give notice to the operator ten
days prior to the effective date of the suspension, within which period
the operator must comply with these financial requirements. " If the sus-
pension becomes effective, the Department is authorized to give the op-
erator notice to surrender his license and registration. " An operator may
appeal any order or act of the Department to the county court of the
county of his residence. "°
The Department gave notices of suspension to a number of vehicle op-
erators who resided in Harris County. They appealed to the county court
of Shelby County, and that court stayed the suspension orders. Since the
stay orders were temporary, the Department could not appeal. Ignoring
the stay orders, the Department notified the operators to surrender their
licenses. The operators sought successfully to have these notices set aside
in the county court of Harris County.
On appeal the Department admitted that if the stay orders of the Shel-
by County court were valid, the suspensions never became effective and it
had no authority to issue the surrender notices. It argued, however, that
the Shelby County court had no jurisdiction to issue the stay orders since
it was not in the county of the operators' residence. The court of civil
appeals rejected the Department's argument and affirmed the trial court."
Characterizing the Shelby County court as a court of general jurisdiction,
it held that its jurisdiction could not be collaterally attacked in the Har-
ris County suit by the introduction of extrinsic evidence, i.e., the fact
of the operators' residence. Thus the Shelby County court's stay orders
were valid, the suspension orders never became final, and the surrender
notices of the Department were improperly issued.
The decision seems questionable. As a general rule, when a method of
appeal is provided by statute, other methods of judicial review are pre-
2 6 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h, §§ 2(b), 4, 5 (1960).
27 id. 5 (b).2 8 Id. 4.
29 Id. 5 (b).
$Old. § 2(b).
" Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Morris, 426 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 12 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 167 (Dec. 31, 1968).
[Vol. 23
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cluded. Since the operators filed their first appeal in a court other than the
one designated by statute, there seems to be a lack of jurisdiction on the
part of that court. This being so, the Department's contention that the
suspension orders had become final and unchallengeable as of the time of
the second appeal, thus authorizing the surrender notices, should have
been sustained."a
Statutory Interpretation. In the survey period Texas courts in several in-
stances passed upon questions of law arising out of the interpretation of
statutes controlling the powers, functions, and duties of administrative
tribunals." In each instance the court decided the question of law inde-
pendently, and in all but one case seemed to give no particular weight to
the interpretation of the statute given by the administrative tribunal.'
32 This was the opinion of the supreme court in Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Morris, 12 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 167 (Dec. 31, 1968). It held that the Shelby County court was "conducting a special
proceeding which exists only by reason of special statutory authorization," so was not for that
proceeding a court of general jurisdiction. Id. at 168. Thus its jurisdiction could be collaterally
attacked.
3 See also note 34 infra. The distinction between questions of law, to be decided by the
court, and questions of fact, to be decided by the administrative agency, is discussed in Dobson
v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). See also 2 F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 665-67; 4 K. DAVIS,
supra note 5, S 30.03. At 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 5, § 5.06, it is said: "In the construction of
a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon
to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect," citing Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827).
" In Kraft v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967), the Supreme Court
of Texas re-examined an earlier decision by a Texas court of civil appeals and adhered to the
rule announced in that case, Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hodson, 346 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961), error ref. n.r.e., deeming it a reasonable interpretation of the Texas Unemployment
Compensation Act. The court further said its view was supported by the failure of three succeed-
ing sessions of the legislature to change the decision by amending the statutory section (Tcx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-3 (d) (1) (1962)) construed in the opinion. 418 S.W.2d at 486.
A court of civil appeals in its interpretation of one of the appeal provisions of the new Mineral
Interest Pooling Act, Trx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c, § 2(g) (1965), undertook to give
the statute a more reasonable construction. Miller v. Railroad Comm'n, 428 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.
Civ. App.), rev'd, 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 141 (Dec. 4, 1968). Section 2(g) of article 6008c of
the Mineral Interest Poolirg Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the Railroad
Commission "effecting pooling" may appeal to the district court of the county in which the
land is located, and provides that this provision is exclusive. Under another statute, TEx. REV.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049c, § 8 (1962), any interested person "affected" by an order of the
Commission under the conservation laws relative to cr,'de petroleum oil or natural gas, who may
be dissatisfied therewith, may file a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County,
and not elsewhere against the Commission to test the validity of the order. The court held that
a forced pooling application to pool a four-acre tract with an existing 650-acre gas unit, if denied
by order of the Commission, nevertheless resulted in an order "effecting pooling" since, until the
denial, there was the possibility that an order for a 654-acre unit would be issued. Inasmuch as
the statute refers to orders effecting pooling, and article 6049c (which is expressly referred to in
the statute in question) is available for appeals from other orders, the holding seems to extend un-
duly the natural and literal meaning of the statutory term "effecting pooling." This was the view
expressed by the supreme court in reversing the court of civil appeals and affirming the trial court.
In neither the court of civil appeals' nor the supreme court's opinion is consideration given to the
Railroad Commission's interpretation of the statutes. This is logical, however, since the statutes
in question have no direct relevancy to the Commission's administration of the oil and gas con-
servation laws.
The supreme court affirmed the interpretation of the Department of Public Safety that the
solder of a self-insurance certificate must not only have more than twenty-five cars registered in
his name when he obtains the certificate, but at all times thereafter. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety
v. Banks Transp. Co., 427 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1968). (The opinion of the court of civil appeals
was reported in last year's Survey article, FitzGerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 223, 225-26 (1968)). TEX. Rev. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h(34) (1960) ex-
pressly provides for the former requirement but is silent as to the latter. In upholding the Depart-
ment, the court, so far as its opinion shows, gave no particular weight to the construction the
Department had given the Act.
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However, in City National Bank v. Falkner" a court of civil appeals
adopted the Banking Commissioner's interpretation of the statutory pro-
vision under consideration. Texas State Bank had moved its location in
the city of Austin. City National Bank sought a declaration in the state
district court that it was within the exclusive power of the State Banking
Board to grant or deny permission to Texas State Bank to make such a
move, and asked for appropriate injunctive relief. City National relied
upon a 1967 amendment to the Texas Banking Code which apparently
gave exclusive power to the Board." The amendment was held unconstitu-
tional by the court of civil appeals. The court adopted the administrative
practice and interpretation under the unamended statutes as declared in
an affidavit of the Banking Commissioner. It appearing from the affidavit
that it was not necessary for the Board to approve a change of location,
the court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of relief.
That the courts will not abdicate their responsibility for statutory in-
terpretation, however, was made evident by the same court of civil ap-
peals, speaking in another case through the same judge. 7 The Railroad
Commission urged the court to follow the Commission's long established
policy of using May 29, 1934, as the date to determine when an illegal
subdivision occurred in the East Texas Field, although this policy was con-
trary to a supreme court decision. The court replied, "The Commission
cannot validly build a departmental construction based on repeated viola-
tions of decisions of our courts."'s
The Substantial Evidence Rule. The substantial evidence rule' is gener-
ally' applied by Texas trial courts sitting de novo and looking to the rec-
ord compiled in the court on appeal rather than to the record in the ad-
ministrative hearing.41 An exception to this practice, discussed in last year's
Survey,' is that courts are now limited under the revised Savings and Loan
Act' to deciding whether there is substantial evidence in the record of the
administrative proceeding to support the Commissioner's grant or denial
3-428 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e. The Supreme Court of Texas,
however, disagreed with certain portions of the opinion of the court below, not here relevant. 432
S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1968).
80TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-315 (1967).
"'Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 424 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
"Id. at 478.
s The contemporary version of the 'substantial evidence' rule as applied in the state
courts is predicated upon the statement made by the United States Supreme Court
in [Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)] that under this
rule the reviewing court is authorized to set aside administrative findings of fact
when-and only when-the court (after taking 'into account whatever in the record
fairly detracts from' the weight of the evidence supporting an agency's findings
of basic fact) is left with the conviction that 'the record . .. clearly precludes' the
agency's 'decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testi-
mony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence
or both.'
2 F. COOPER, sujra note 8, at 727.4
°See FitzGerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 199 n.4
(1967).
41 id.
42 FitzGerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 223, 226 (1968).




of an application for a new charter or branch office. How much more
discretion is thus available to the state for regulating the savings and loan
field than is available to it for administering state functions in other areas,
in which the state by statute is subject to greater judicial supervision, will
depend considerably on the extent to which the courts weigh the evidence
taken by the Commissioner. They have seemingly weighed the evidence in
savings and loan cases more than in other instances of review of admin-
istrative action and there are signs that the courts of civil appeals continue
to do so,"' just as there are signs that the supreme court is taking a more
restrictive view of the proper role of the reviewing court.'
In a recent court of civil appeals case" a concurring judge criticized the
Texas substantial evidence rule, as applied in the case, which requires trial
de novo (but rejects review de novo) on the appeal of many administra-
tive orders. A fire chief was discharged after a hearing held by the local
civil service commission. His written admission of the offense charged was
not received into evidence by the commission, but its substance was testi-
fied to by the fire chief. On appeal by trial de novo, the district court ad-
mitted the written statement, and upheld the commission. The majority
of the court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the evi-
dence taken by the court constituted substantial evidence on which to
base the administrative order.
Justice Cadena would have affirmed on the basis of the administrative
record rather than the trial record. He contended that to look to the
"See, e.g., Gerst v. Houston First Say. Ass'n, 422 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Gerst
v. Oak Cliff Say. & Loan Ass'n, 421 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), revd, 432 S.W.2d 702
(Tex. 1968); Spring Branch Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Gerst, 420 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
It is to be noted that the reversals of the Commissioner's actions by the district courts and
courts of civil appeals have, in the random cases cited, occurred when the Commissioner was deny-
ing a savings and loan charter or branch office application. In an application for a state bank chart-
er, under a reasonably similar statute insofar as statutory qualifications are concerned, the district
court and the court of civil appeals affirmed the State Banking Board's approval of the application
for bank charter. First Nat'l Bank v. State Banking Bd., 419 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
4sGerst v. Guardian Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 425 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114 (Nov. 13, 1968) (Commissioner approved one application
for a branch office at an intersection and denied the other, ruling that the market would not sup-
port both and rejecting, after a consolidated hearing, the application that was filed one hour earlier.
He found the latter would impair the expansion opportunity of the main office of the other asso-
ciation located two miles away from the intersection. The district court and court of civil appeals
reversed, holding that the findings of the Commissioner were not supported by substantial evidence.
The supreme court, reserving the question whether the earlier filed application would be decided
first, reversed the lower courts and held there was substantial evidence supporting the findings of the
Commissioner that (1) there was not room in the market for two new branch offices, and (2) a
branch office grant to Guardian would impair the existing main office expansion of its opponent,
Richardson. With reference to an apparent contradiction in testimony on the issue of impairment
the supreme court said: "The credibility of witnesses is within the province of the Commissioner."
Id. at 116.); Gerst v. Goldsbury, 425 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.), revsd sub nom. Savings & Loan
Comm'r v. Goldsbury, 12 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 111 (Nov. 13, 1968) (the Commissioner denied a sav-
ings and loan charter due to lack of public need and lack of assurance of profitable operation;
the district court reversed, and the court of civil appeals affirmed on the basis that there was no
substantial evidence to support the negative findings of the Commissioner; the supreme court re-
versed, holding that if the evidence is substantial enough to support either affirmative or negative
findings by the Commissioner the reviewing court should not superimpose its judgment).
In these cases a court of civil appeals reversed an administrative denial of a permit. But see
Peoples Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Community Say. & Loan Ass'n, 430 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968), error ref. n.r.e., in which the Commissioner's denial of both applications was reversed,
but his denial of one application was upheld.
"Garcia v. City of San Antonio, 427 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
1969]
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trial court record, containing different evidence from the administrative
record, for substantial evidence supporting the administrative action de-
feated an express statutory requirement that the commission "render a
fair and just decision, considering only the evidence presented before
them in such hearing."" In the same vein, he considered that looking to
different evidence in the trial court deprived the chief of "a fair and
impartial hearing before an agency which will act only on the basis of the
evidence which it hears."4 Limiting judicial review of administrative ac-
tion to the evidence actually heard by the commisson, he argued, would
not violate the doctrine of separation of powers as the doctrine had been
held to be violated by a statute requiring the reviewing court to establish
administrative policy.4'
Justice Cadena is correct that the separation of powers doctrine does
not stand in the way of his suggestion. It seems clear, however, that the
majority view is not founded on a concept of separation of powers. It is
founded, as is Justice Cadena's for that matter, on statutory construction
-giving partial, though not complete, effect to the provision of this sta-
tute and many other statutes that appeals to the district court from deci-
sions of the commission "shall be tried de novo. ' 'a° Giving literal effect to
this type of statute would require an independent judicial determination
of the issues which would be prohibited by the separation of powers pro-
vision of the Texas Constitution"1 if one or all of the issues were inherent-
ly administrative in nature. The Texas courts, wherever possible, have
given a limited, middle-of-the-road interpretation to such statutes: al-
lowing the facts to be re-tried on appeal from the administrative order,
refraining from deciding such issues on the basis of the judicial trial, and
approving the order if supported by substantial evidence in the judicial
record.
Thus this type of statutory provision traditionally has been construed
as an expression of legislative will binding the courts to give at minimum
the scope of review given in this case. No doubt Texas courts would pre-
fer to give a more restrictive view, but they have felt obligated to observe
the legislative will in this regard." For the same reason, Justice Cadena
would have the courts observe the statutory provision to which he called
attention. It would seem, however, as a matter of statutory construction,
that the apparent majority view is correct, since the provision quoted by
Justice Cadena applies by its terms only to the administrative hearing,
not to the appeal.
4 7
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16a (1963). See also Garcia v. City of San An-
tonio, 427 S.W.2d 947, 950 n.l (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
48 Garcia v. City of San Antonio, 427 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
49See Gerst v. Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1967).
5
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 18 (1963).
" TEx. CONST. art. II, S 1.
" Larson, The Substantial Evidence Rule: Texas Version, 5 Sw. L.J. 152 (1951).
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